Interpretivism

Just as many sociology textbooks frequently make a distinction between Structuralist sociology and Interactionist sociology, they also tend to draw a sharp distinction between a positivist methodology (applied by Structuralists') and an interpretivist methodology (applied by Interactionists).

Although this is not necessarily a false distinction, it is not always a very useful one. By creating a dichotomy between, on the one hand, "positivist" sociology and, on the other, "anti-positivist" sociology, two impressions are given:

Firstly, the impression that "Structuralism" and "positivism" go hand-in-hand.

Secondly, the impression that "interpretivism" - and by extension "Interactionist sociology" - is somehow
"un-scientific".

That this kind of formulation is false can be relatively easily demonstrated in the following way:

As various Interactionist sociologists have noted, the subject matter of sociology (people or subjects) is qualitatively different to the subject matter of the natural sciences (objects). In this respect:

Objects do not have consciousness (they cannot think or reflect on their condition or purpose), while human beings clearly do.

A physicist, for example, can happily study the cosmos, the movement of planets, comets, stars and so forth, safe in the knowledge that the "behaviour" of such things is conditioned by their reaction to external stimuli. The behaviour of the moon, for example, is conditioned by the gravitational pull of the earth. If we calculate such things as how fast the earth is moving through space, its mass and so forth, we can predict the behaviour of the moon.

In this respect, the behaviour of the moon is caused by the behaviour of the earth (amongst other things) and it cannot, for example, choose not to follow the earth in its orbit around the sun.

A human being, on the other hand, does have a choice:

If, for example, I choose to follow someone around, it is by no means certain that I do so because I am simply reacting to their behaviour. I may believe myself to be in love with them and am attempting to express my love by following them everywhere. While I am following them, my behaviour, over time, may be reasonably predictable (along the lines of if you see the person I am following, you might reasonably expect to see me also). However, at any given moment, I may choose not to follow my loved one - because they told me to go away, because I no-longer love them, because its time for my dinner, because...the list is endless.

This rather silly example does, however, have a point, namely that human beings, as Haralambos ("Themes and Perspectives", 1990) notes:

"See, interpret and experience the world in terms of meanings; they actively construct their own social reality. Meanings do not have an independent existence, a reality of their own which is somehow separate from social actors. They are not imposed by an external society which constrains members to act in certain ways. Instead, they are constructed and reconstructed by actors in the course of social interaction.".

If this is indeed the case, then it follows that the methodology (and, by extension, methods of research) that is entirely appropriate to the subject matter of one branch of science (the natural sciences), is not necessarily appropriate to the subject matter of another branch (the social sciences).

Thus, if matter was not inanimate, but animate (like human beings), it would follow that the methodology of the natural sciences would have to change to account for this fact, since a physicist could no-longer be certain that the behaviour of the moon, for example, was a "simple" response to the stimulation provided by the earth.

Finally, interpretivist sociology does not reject the idea of a scientific methodology per se. That is, Interactionist sociologists do not argue that it is impossible to employ "scientific principles" (such as logical consistency, rules of evidence, hypothesis development and testing and the like) in the study of human behaviour.

What they do argue, however, is that the basic methodological model proposed by positivist sociologists (based upon the natural scientific model) is inadequate as a methodological model for the study of conscious human beings.

Thus, it is not science itself that is rejected, but simply one model of a scientific methodology.

Max Weber ("The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation", 1922) neatly sums-up the Social Action / Interactionist position thus:
"Sociology (in the sense in which this highly ambiguous word is used here) is a science which attempts the interpretive understanding of social action in order thereby to arrive at a causal explanation of its course and effects. In 'action' is included all human behaviour when and in so far as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to it. Action in this sense may be either overt or purely inward or subjective; it may consist of positive intervention in a situation, or of deliberately refraining from such intervention or passively acquiescing in the situation. Action is social in so far as, by virtue of the subjective meaning attached to it by the acting individual (or individuals) it takes account of the behaviour of others and is thereby oriented in its course.".

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Note: Unscientific

The general confusion over the question of whether or not an Interpretivist methodology is "unscientific" comes mainly from the way in which the concept of "science" tends to be defined. Thus, in our society, for example:

1. The natural sciences are assumed to represent a model of scientific methodology.

2. Positivist sociology aims to apply the methodology of the natural sciences; therefore, it is scientific.

3. Interactionist sociology is non-positivist and rejects positivist forms of methodology.

4. Therefore, Interpretive sociology is "unscientific".

However if we assume, for the sake of argument, that there may be different ways of producing "scientific" forms of knowledge, the question of whether or not Interpretivism is "scientific" is largely irrelevant.

This basic idea - namely, that there may be different ways of producing reliable and valid knowledge which depend to some degree on the nature of the subject matter being studied - will assume increasing importance when we consider post-modern approaches to "knowledge" and "methodology".

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Note: Interactionist Writers

Although there are a large number of writers who have worked / are working within this general perspective, we can note the following as being significant for reference purposes:

Max Weber ("The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation", 1922),

George Herbert Mead
("Mind, Self and Society", 1934),

Erving Goffman ("The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life", 1959) and

Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann ("The Social Construction of Reality", 1967).

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